Adheeb was under ‘house arrest’, still not an uncommon legal practice in the country along with such archaic penal provision like ‘island arrest’

For a person who has arrived as an ‘extra hand’ on a dhow to neighbouring India, former Maldivian Vice-President, Ahmed Adheeb, has had a ‘chequered career’, which saw him becoming the youngest VP at 33 only to serve the shortest term in office, and arrested for attempting to assassinate his boss -- the even more controversial (then) President, Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom.

Adheeb was under ‘house arrest’, still not an uncommon legal practice in the country along with such archaic penal provision like ‘island arrest’, even under the new penal code, formulated in the era of democratic reforms, where much of the rest of the nation’s law and administrative practices have changed.
As he was moving towards the peak of his political glory, the political Opposition of the time, especially the now-ruling Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) of current President Ibrahim ‘Ibu’ Solih, would call him Yameen’s henchman and manager of the ‘Male gangs’ purportedly employed for political purposes. But Adheeb was a suave operator being a graduate from Staffordshire University (2007) plus a Masters in Business Administration from Edith Cowan University in the very next year.

All of 37 (born 11 April 1982) now, Adheeb began his career in the Maldives Customs Service, and soon became a businessman in his own right and ending up as the office-bearer of local chambers, one ladder upon the other. And when the nation was still immersed and/or recovering from the multi-party democratic presidential poll of 2008, which saw MDP’s Mohammed ‘Anni’ Nasheed
replacing Yameen’s half-brother, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, dubbed an ‘autocrat’ as President after

30 long years, young Adeeb saw his opportunity, and began talking about economics - which not many politicians in the country were much interested and even less aware of.
But he did not miss the eyes of Yameen, Gayoom’s controversial Finance Minister over the past years, who also prided himself as an otherwise reclusive ‘economic administrator’, rather than charismatic political leader. So much was Yameen impressed by Adheeb that when he became
President in 2013, he made the ‘lad’ the Tourism Minister, the most coveted Cabinet position after that of the President. Adeeb was a first-term minister at that time, and though there were murmurs of protest within the ruling Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM), founded by Gayoom, none contested his presumed abilities.

When political trouble began knocking at President Yameen’s doors continuously from end-2014, he began suspecting his own chosen Vice-President from 2013 polls, Dr Mohamed Jameel Ahmed.
Fearing imminent arrest, Jameel escaped to the UK, where the likes of Nasheed had already obtained ‘political asylum’. Yameen would have Parliament impeach Jameel, a PhD holder in criminology from a reputed British University, and made Adheeb take his place.
Assassination plot? What was even more impressive about Adheeb’s overnight elevation was the unique manner Yameen got it through - having the Parliament to amend the Constitution and other relevant laws for bringing down the minimum age for vice-presidency to 30 years from the prescribed 35. This, even as he had pegged an upper age-limit for the presidency and vice- presidency at 65 years, that too with the Opposition MDP, among other parties in Parliament.

None else could stand better as testimony to the adage, ‘what that goes up has to come down’ than Ahmed Adheeb, in the Maldivian scenario, especially. Becoming VP out of the blue on 22 July 2015, he would not only lose the job but also be arrested ahead of his own impeachment (5 November 2015), that too, of all things, for attempting to assassinate President Yameen.

The ironic meeting point, though pure coincidental, was that Yameen was returning from Saudi Arabia and the police waited for Adeeb to return from a 10-day maiden tour to China - two nations that were incongruous ideologically but were meeting and working separately on Maldivian
development under Yameen. Yameen escaped unhurt when a bomb went off under the President’s chair in his official speed-boat, but First Lady Fathimath Ibrahim, reportedly suffered injuries.
House arrest and more: Not stopping with hauling Adheeb up for the assassination-attempt, the Yameen administration also charged him with a host of other crimes, including a massive embezzlement of public funds through a marketing organisation with which he was associated. The irony, after Yameen’s exit, or even when he was in power, both Maldivian authorities and more so
his successor Solih Government, have been linking much of those illegal funds, amounting to millions of dollars and in an exchange-racket, to Yameen himself. A court case is already on in this regard, and it is possible that Adeeb could as well become a witness.
However, there is a possible twist to the tale. Even as in the post-Yameen era, courts converted
Adheeb’s prison-term to house-arrest, he also went overseas for medical treatment - and returned, supposedly to face his court cases and appeals. But if Adheeb has now jumped those court cases and the nation’s authorities and laws, there was this recent episode of Abdulla Lufthfee, the brain behind the failed 1988 coup-bid against President Gayoom.

Lufthee, who was serving a life-term under anti-terrorism law following arrest by Indian forces on high seas, after foiling the coup-bid under ‘Operation Cactus’, jumped law, while in India for medical treatment, only to suddenly appear in Maldives’ Colombo Embassy in March this year (after the change of govt in Male). Last month, there was a lot of noise in Maldives, especially Parliament, for
‘extraditing’ Lufthee. It was promptly accomplished.

Now, thus, it is the turn of Adheeb, maybe; but to what end, it is unclear as yet.

India can catalyse trading in oil on its domestic exchanges, and thereby adjust global oil prices so they reflect the changing patterns of global trade. In the process, this can help Indian companies and government reduce the risks arising from high energy prices. And in the long run, it can give India a more central position in the global financial system.

Even though the centre of gravity of global oil trade has shifted from the West to Asia, the oil trade is still managed on Western exchanges. That means prices are set using Western benchmarks (Brent and West Texas Intermediate), and the medium for exchange remains the U.S. Dollar. This anomaly puts Asian countries at a disadvantage that will only grow worse with time as trade becomes increasingly skewed toward Asia. But a solution is within reach: India needs to push for a bigger role for its exchanges and currency in the oil trade. This will help improve the country’s energy security and create a bigger international role for the rupee. But the time to act is now. China already is challenging Western dominance by pushing its own commodity exchanges and currency as an alternative to the petrodollar. India, with its open markets and transparent regulation, has a distinct advantage over China, but it must seize the opportunity soon.

The benefits of exploiting India’s strengths are considerable. Widespread use of the U.S. Dollar as the international medium of exchange has long kept down borrowing costs for the American government and consumers. It also has given the U.S. enormous geopolitical leverage – as demonstrated by its ability to impose and enforce sanctions against Iran, Venezuela and Russia. Many governments, including India, have publicly said that they don’t recognise these unilateral sanctions, but companies in these countries quietly comply because they otherwise could lose access to the U.S. financial system, which would be catastrophic for any large commercial entity.

Physical trade has shifted

There is no question that the financial trade in oil is increasingly out of sync with the physical trade. Due to its increasing shale-oil production, the U.S. is no longer the top importer of oil – China is.
Four of the five top importers of oil – China, India, Japan, and South Korea – are in Asia. And Asia, led by India, is expected to be the major driver of future growth in oil demand, at a time when oil consumption in Western countries is flat or declining.

Asian commodity exchanges can play a larger role in the oil trade by getting buyers and sellers together and helping producers and consumers hedge their risks. This role doesn’t have to be

restricted to India’s own market; it can extend to international trade and thereby play a global role in price discovery and in setting new benchmarks. China already has established a new exchange in Shanghai – the International Energy Exchange. It has a large trading volume, but the trading pattern indicates that most of this trade is speculative, and not linked to physical trade. Moreover, China’s record of interfering in financial markets and its opaque regulatory framework makes it a dodgy prospect for international finance. India, with its better regulated markets, can offer a better Asian
alternative. That India is the third largest user and importer of oil, with growing demand and without China’s geopolitical agenda of replacing Western institutions makes India’s case stronger.

How can it be done?

India’s Multicommodity Exchange already features trading in oil contracts, but the activity almost entirely involves contracts close to expiry. To function fully, an exchange requires buyers and sellers involved in actual trade of the underlying commodity. India has ample buyers, but its domestic oil production is low and mostly comes from government companies,so there are no natural sellers of oil futures and options in India.

This can be changed, however, by establishing Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) for crude oil on Indian exchanges – like existing ETFs for gold that are run by many mutual funds. Owners of such ETFs become natural sellers of long-duration options and futures, thus improving market liquidity. Once ETFs are established, the next step will be to bring in long-dated futures and options for the ‘Indian basket’ – a new benchmark that reflects consumption patterns that prevail in India (and Asia generally). An added benefit of establishing crude-oil ETFs will be that the underlying oil, which would be physically stored in India, could be used in an emergency. In effect, it would become the strategic petroleum reserve that the government is trying to create using public money.

Crude oil is unusable until it is refined; for the exchange to serve as a hedging tool, contracts on oil products – such as diesel, petrol and aviation fuel – will have to be introduced so that oil consumers could cover their risk in case of price fluctuations. The biggest at-risk party to high oil prices of course, remains the government, which had to subsidise consumers for nearly a decade (2005-15) when oil prices were high. Since the government carries the risk should oil prices rise again, it can use the exchange to hedge against certain scenarios (if, say, the price of oil rises above $100 per barrel). Other governments, including Mexico, Uruguay and Jamaica, have used financial market hedges to protect themselves against oil price fluctuations; the Indian government could use an Indian commodity exchange for the same purpose.

India’s gain

In the short run, having a vibrant commodity exchange operating in India will create thousands of high-paying finance jobs and help Indian consumers hedge against the risk of energy price fluctuations. Physical settlement of these contracts will require creation of tens (if not hundreds) of millions of barrels of storage infrastructure, which can double as a strategic reserve in emergencies. In the longer run, becoming a centre of energy trade that sets energy price benchmarks will elevate India to a central position in the global financial system. India, in short, can become a rule-maker in the global oil trade instead of the rule-taker it is today.

Why is the Sino-Indian border dispute considered intractable in nature? Will it become more/less resoluble in the near future?
This commentary examines the conditions for its resolution, derived from past research on border disputes, bargaining, and negotiations in international relations. It considers three conditions for resolution: 1) If neither country sees an interest in continuing this conflict 2) If the contours of the resolution seem like a win-win scenario for nationalist-realists on both sides, and 3) if both sides have the ability to make reneging on an agreement a costly affair.

First, China has likely calculated that it is more logical to wait out the current border status quo to arrive to a more beneficial deal in the future. This is due to the interest in a swift resolution seeming to be more from India's side given its relatively weaker position based on military strength and economics. China's growth projection for 2020 is 6-6.5 per cent. India's economy grew quicker in 2018-19 (by 7 per cent), and is expected to steadily grow at around 7.5 per cent over the current and next two financial years. However, this belies the sizeable difference between their GDPs: China's GDP for 2018-19 was US$ 13.6 trillion, while India's GDP for the same year was US$ 2.72 trillion (approximately 5 times less than China's). Therefore, China's gains from a 6 per cent growth are substantially greater than India's gains from a 7 or 7.5 per cent growth. China is therefore increasing its economic differential relative to India.

Domestically, there have also been questions about the resilience of the Indian economy including concerns that India's GDP measurements are unsound, resulting in an inflated figure and
lending a measure of uncertainty to projected growth estimates. In terms of military spending, data put out by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows China's military spending to be US$ 250 billion in 2018-19, while India's was US$ 66.5 billion. This paints a clear picture of the military-economic power differential between India and China. Since China is growing more powerful over time in military-economic terms, waiting out the status quo to arrive at a future resolution is a rational option.

Second, there is serious doubt about whether a "win-win" narrative can ever emerge for nationalists on both sides given the present scenario. Territorial integrity is a central driver to India's national identity ever since Indian Independence in 1947. Indian society is extremely diverse in terms of regional cultures, religions, ethnicities, and linguistics. In this context, the belief in the sanctity of India's territoriality aids the conception of an Indian nationality and what it represents. Historically, however, India has come to territorial resolutions which resulted in a net loss of territory. One instance is the 2015 India-Bangladesh land swap agreement, and another is the 1976 agreement which granted the previously disputed Katchatheevu Island sovereign recognition by India as a Sri Lankan island. (Officially, India does not recognise this as "ceding" territory).

Conversely, China's history of treaties (examples include Tajikistan, Russia,Myanmar and Pakistan) points to a trend in which Beijing only seems to accept territorial dispute resolutions that result in

net territorial gain for China. The projection of historical wrongs using Ming and Qing era maps makes territorial concessions difficult for China without 'loss of face'. In fact, even a resolution involving acknowledgement of the current territorial status quo could be painted as a narrative of Chinese concession, triggering external observers (states like Brunei, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, the US) to demand withdrawals and concessions elsewhere in the South China Sea (SCS). This is a circumstance Beijing does not want to entertain as the SCS is a core maritime interest.

Beijing also likely believes that India is the more flexible party in bilateral border negotiations based on precedent. This perception therefore may lead them to expect a future agreement that results in net territorial gain. However, this belief would be a miscalculation on China's part. The existence of territories (Aksai Chin, Demchok) claimed by India and controlled by China results in a scenario in which India would be unwilling to come to a resolution that contributes to territorial concessions to China.

Third, even if a land border agreement was reached, how could India guarantee its enforceability? China will be secure that India will not renege on a land boundary agreement due to its superior military and economic standing which enables swift and effective reprisal. India does not share this same security, and is more wary of China reneging on an agreement. India has also noted China's territorial encroachments into Nepal, Bhutan, and India(prominent cases include the case of almost a thousand troops entering Ladakh's Chumur sector in 2014, and a stand-off in Sikkim in 2017) and is therefore unlikely to trust that any agreement made will stand firm. This lack of trust and India's unequal ability to enforce any possible resolution solidifies the intractability of the dispute.

The discernible imbalance in the India-China power differential, past history and current nationalism, core interests, and lack of mutual trust operate in a matrix and reinforce the intractability of the border issue. Projecting from these current conditions, it does not seem likely that there will be a land border resolution between the two states in the near future. Unless there is a foundational change in bilateral relations involving a substantial increase in India's military-economic capacities and a reversal in Beijing's negotiating approach, the status quo is projected to continue.